HMAC is the internet standard for message authentication BCK96,KBC97]. What distinguishes HMAC from other MAC algorithms is that it provides proofs of security assuming that the underlying cryptographic hash (e.g. SHA-1) has some reasonable properties. HMAC is e cient for long messages, however, for short messages the nested constructions results in a signi cant ine ciency. For example to MAC a message shorter than a block, HMAC requires at least two calls to the compression function rather than one.
Introduction
Message Authentication. The design of good Message Authentication schemes is one of the important areas of cryptography. The goal in message authentication is for one party to e ciently transmit a message to another party in such a way that the receiving party can determine whether or not the message he receives has been tampered with. The setting involves two parties, Alice and Bob, who have agreed on a pre-speci ed secret key x. There are two algorithms used: a signing algorithm S x and a veri cation algorithm V x . If Alice wants to send a message M to Bob then she rst computes a message authentication code, or MAC, = S x (M). She sends (M; ) to Bob, and upon receiving the pair, Bob computes V x (M; ) which returns 1 if the MAC is valid, or returns 0 otherwise. In other words, without knowledge of the secret key x, it is next to impossible for an adversary to construct a message and corresponding MAC that the veri cation algorithm will be accept as valid.
The formal security requirement for a Message Authentication Code was de ned in BKR94]. This de nition was an analog to the formal de nition of security for digital signatures GMR88]. In particular, we say that an adversary forges a MAC if, when given oracle access to (S x ; V x ), where x is kept secret, the adversary can come up with a valid pair (M ; ) such that V x (M ; ) = 1 but the message M was never made an input to the oracle for S x .
Cryptographic Hash Function Approach. One common approach to message authentication commonly seen in practice involves the use of cryptographic hash functions such as MD5
and SHA-1. These schemes are good because they use fast and secure cryptographic building blocks. Creating a MAC from a hash function may seem deceptively easy. It seems all one needs to do is to put a key somewhere in the hash function. A easy way to accomplish this is to prepend the key to the data before hashing. Unfortunately, this is not secure and one can forge MACs on unseen messages as we described next. To forge a MAC for the prepend key construction, we begin with a previously MACed message x and its tag MAC k (x). We create a new message z by appending any message y to x, z = (x,y). To create the tag MAC k (z) we use MAC k (x) as the chaining variable and hash y, making sure to set the length of the message to be the length of z.
The result will be MAC k (z). Thus we have forged the MAC for z.
HMAC, the mandatory internet standard for message authentication, uses the cryptographic hash approach. What distinguishes HMAC from other cryptographic hash based MACs is its formal security analysis. The analysis provides a proof of security of HMAC assuming the underlying cryptographic hash is (weakly) collision resistant and that the underlying compression function is a secure MAC when both are appropriately keyed.
This Work. HMAC is e cient for long messages, however, for short messages the nested constructions results in a signi cant ine ciency. For example to MAC a message shorter than a block, HMAC requires at least two calls to the hash function rather than one. This ine ciency may be particularly high for some applications, like message authentication of signaling messages, where the individual messages may all t within one or two blocks. Also for TCP/IP tra c it is well known that a large number of packets (e.g. acknowledgement) have sizes around 40 bytes which t within a block of most cryptographic hashes. We propose an enhancement that allows both short and long messages to be message authenticated more e ciently than HMAC while also providing proofs of security. For a message smaller than a block our MAC only requires one call to the hash function.
Preliminaries
Cryptographic hash functions Cryptographic hash functions, F(x), are public, keyless, and collision-resistant functions which map inputs, x, of arbitrary lengths into short outputs. Collisionresistance implies that it should be computationally infeasible to nd two messages x 1 and x 2 such that F(x 1 ) = F(x 2 ). MD5, SHA-1, and RIPE-MD are widely used cryptographic hash functions.
Along with collision-resistance, the hash functions are usually designed to have other properties both inorder to use the function for other purposes and to increase the likelihood of collisionresistance.
Iterated cryptographic hash functions Most cryptographic hash functions like MD5 and SHA-1 use an iterated construction where the input message is processed block by block. The basic building block is called the compression function, f which takes two inputs of size l and b and maps into a shorter output of length l. The l sized input is called the chaining variable and the b sized input is used to actually process the message b bits at a time. The hash function F(x) then is formed by iterating the compression function f over the message m using these steps:
1. Use an appropriate procedure to append the message length and pad to make the input a multiple of the block size b. The input can be broken into block size pieces x = x 1 ; : : : ; x n . 2. h 0 = IV , a xed constant. 3. For i = 1 to n h i = f(h i?1 ; x i ) 4. output h n as F(x).
Keyed Hash functions Cryptographic hash functions by design are keyless. However, since message authentication requires the use of a secret key, we need a method to key the hash function. The method we use in this paper is the same as that used by NMAC BCK96] where a secret key is used instead of the xed and known IV. In this case the key k replaces the chaining variable in the compression function f(chainingvariable; x) to form f k (x) = f(k; x) where x is of block size b. The iterated hash function F(IV; x) is modi ed by replacing the xed IV with the secret key k to form F k (x) = F(k; x). Collision resistance for keyed function is di erent because the adversary cannot evaluate F k (x) at any points without querying the user. This requirement is weaker than the standard collision requirement and hence we will call the function F k (x) to be weakly collision-resistant BCK96] .
NMAC and HMAC
HMAC is a practical variant of the NMAC construction de ned in BCK96]. The formal security proofs are given for NMAC and its relation to HMAC is described. First we describe the NMAC construction and state the theorem proved in BCK96].
The NMAC Function
The message authentication function NMAC is de ned as
where the cryptographic hash function is rst keyed with the secret key k 2 instead of IV and the message x is hashed to the short output. This output is then padded to a block size according to the padding scheme of F and then F is keyed with secret key k 1 and hashed. Thus the NMAC key k has two parts k = (k 1 ; k 2 ). The following theorem about relating the security of NMAC to the security of the underlying cryptographic hash function is proved in BCK96]:
Theorem 1 In t steps andueries if the keyed compression function f is an f secure MAC, and the keyed iterated hash F is F weakly collision-resistant then the NMAC function is ( f + F ) secure MAC.
E ciency of NMAC
The NMAC construction makes two calls to F, the inner call to F k 2 (x) has the same cost as the keyless hash function F(x). Thus the outer call to F k 1 () is an extra call beyond that required by the keyless hash function. The outer function call is basically a call to the keyed compression function f k 1 () since the l size output of F k 2 (x) can t in the b size input to the compression function. For large x consisting of many blocks the cost of the extra outer compression call is not signi cant. However, for small sized messages x the extra compression function can in terms of percentage result in a signi cantly high ine ciency when compared to the unkeyed hash function. Figure 1 shows the ine ciency for small x for the SHA-1 hash function. in 30 byte increments. The ine ciency of NMAC with respect to the underlying hash function is also noted in the gure.
As can be seen the penalty for small messages can be large. In particular, for messages which t within a block, the penalty is 100% because two compression function calls are required in NMAC versus one call by the underlying cryptographic hash function. Also ipad and opad are xed constants, see BCK96]for details. HMAC requires 4 calls to the compression function, the rst time its evaluated. If the intermediate keys can be cached and loaded directly into the chaining variable then HMAC subsequently requires at least two calls. If direct loading of the keys into the chaining variable is not possible then HMAC continues to require at least 4 calls to the compression function. HMAC's security relies on an added assumption that the compression function has some pseudorandom properties.
ENMAC: Enhanced NMAC
We present a MAC construction which is not only signi cantly more e cient than NMAC for short messages but is also somewhat more e cient for longer messages. Recall that f k (x) is the compression function whose input block size is b bits and the output size is l bits, also the size of the chaining variable and hence the key size also is l bits.
ENMAC k (x) = f k 1 (x; pad; 1) if jxj <= b ? 2 bits = f k 1 (x pref ; F k 2 (x suf f ); 0) else where in the rst case the rst b?2 bits in the block are used to hold the message x. If the message x does not ll the block completely, then padding is required and the remaining block, except the last bit, is lled with a mandatory 1 followed by 0s, possibly none. In the case that the message is b ? 2 bits long, the b ? 1th bit is set to 1. The last bit of the block, indicates whether a single compression call is used for ENMAC. The last bit of the block is set to 1 in the single compression call case, and is set to 0 when multiple compression calls are required which we describe next. The padding scheme for the single block case is unambiguous in the sense that every message, x, less than or equal to b ? 2 bits is uniquely mapped to a b bit string.
In the second case where things will not t in one block, the string x is broken into two pieces x pref and x suf f , where x pref = x 1 : : : x b?l?1 x suf f = x b?l : : : x jxj First x suf f is hashed using k 2 to produce the l bit tag. Then an outer compression call is performed using k 1 where the rst b ? l ? 1 bits are set to x pref and the next l bits are set to the tag F k 2 (x suf f ), and the last bit is set to 0.
SHA-1-ENMAC
The ENMAC construction, described abstractly above, may become clearer when we look at the concrete case of using SHA-1 as the underlying cryptographic hash function.
1. If jxj 510 bits then goto next step else goto step 7.
2. The 512 bit payload of f k 1 () is formed by loading x into the rst 510 bits. 3. Append a 1 to x. 4 . Append as few 0s (possibly none) as needed to ll 511 bits. If jxj is less than 510 bits than zeroes will be padded beyond the 1 or else if jxj is 510 bits then no zeroes are padded and only a single 1 is added at the 511-th bit position. 5. The last 512-th bit is set to 1, to indicate the message ts in a single block. 6. Apply the keyed compression function on the payload and output the result. 7. Split x into two pieces x pref and x suf f where x pref = x 1 : : : x 351 and x suf f = x 352 : : : x jxj . 8. Apply the keyed hash function F k 2 (x suf f ). 9. Form the 512 bit payload of f k 1 by setting the last bit to 0. 10. Set the rst 351 bits to be x pref . 11. Set the next 160 bits to be F k 2 (x suf f ) calculated in step 8.
12. Apply the keyed compression function on the payload and output the result.
x in 240 bit increments # of f in F(x) # of f in ENMAC % ine ciency   240  1  1  0%  480  2  1  -50%  720  2  2  0%  960  3  3  0%  1200  3  3  0%  1440  3  4  33%  1680  4  4  0% We can see a signi cant di erence between this gure and the previous gure which compared plain NMAC. For many of the short sizes ENMAC has the same e ciency as the underlying hash function, For larger messages the e ciency of NMAC, ENMAC and the underlying hash function will not be signi cantly di erent from each other. For message of size 480 bits the entry in gure 2 surprisingly indicates that the ENMAC is more e cient than the underlying hash function! This anomaly occurs because the underlying SHA-1 function reserves 64 bits for size information while ENMAC reserves only 2 bits for messages less than 510 bits. Thus the savings resulting from using ENMAC are signi cant for messages that t in one or few of blocks.
Security of ENMAC
Motivation If we were to use a di erent key k 3 to MAC messages which t in one block and use key k = (k 1 ; k 2 ) to MAC larger messages using NMAC then we could argue the system would be secure. Essentially, this is what is being done, but instead of using a di erent key to create a di erent MAC, the trailing bit is being set to 1 if the message ts in one block and its set to 0 for the other case. Secondly, whereas NMAC pads the payload of the outer compression call with zeroes, we t part of the message in the outer call. Our security results are similar to NMAC and we state our security theorem and prove it next.
Theorem 2 In t steps andueries if the keyed compression function f is an f secure MAC, and the keyed iterated hash F is F weakly collision-resistant then the ENMAC function is ( f + F ) secure MAC.
Proof: Suppose an adversary A E is successful against ENMAC with probability E assuming t time steps and q adaptively chosen queries to the ENMAC function. We will use this adversary to build another adversary A f which will forge a MAC associated with the keyed compression function on a previously unqueried message. We will bound this probability of breaking the MAC in terms of E and F , where F is the best probability of an adversary nding a collision in the hash function F in time t andueries. We know that the probability of breaking the MAC in this particular way, using A E , has to be less than the best probability of breaking the MAC in any way, f . We use this in turn to get a bound on E . Figure 3 outlines the algorithm A f which we describe next.
A f algorithm will attack the MAC f by rst querying it on x 1 : : : x q and get f k1 (x 1 ) : : : f k1 (x q ). Inside A f , the algorithm A E is being run; A E itself will want to query the ENMAC function before it attacks the ENMAC. Actually there is no real ENMAC function that we are attacking, the real thing we want to attack is the MAC f k1 (). So we are simulating an ENMAC function to the A E algorithm by answering its query correctly. We have picked a random k 2 , and when A E asks us to form ENMAC of messages x i we will use the key k 2 to form the inside calculation part F k2 (), and for the outer part of ENMAC, which is f k1 (), we actually call the real MAC that we want to attack. When the A E queries for ENMAC(x i ) we see if x i will t in a single block or requires multiple block. If it ts in a single block then we just make a call to the real MAC function f k1 () with the arguments (x i ; pad; 1). The indicator bit is used here and set to 1. On the other hand if multiple blocks will be used then we rst evaluate F k2 (x i;suf f ) then we make a call to the real MAC with the arguments (x i;pref ; F k2 (x i;suf f ); 0). The indicator bit is set to zero. Now suppose the A E algorithm has forged an ENMAC tag y on an unseen, unqueried message x and the message ts in one block. ENMAC tag on a small message x is equivalent to f k1 () MAC tag on unseen message (x; pad; 1). Now this is the crucial role about the indicator bit. The pair (x; y = ENMAC(x)) was never queried or requested by the A E algorithm inside the A f algorithm. Thus all the previous calls to the real f k1 () MAC made on behalf of the A E queries never made the real MAC call with argument (x; pad; 1) ! This we see because the only calls to the real MAC that were made were either f k1 (::::; 1) on behalf of single block ENMAC queries or f k1 (::::; 0) on behalf of multiple block ENMAC queries, no other calls to the real MAC were made. So the indicator bit creates an independence from the multiple block ENMAC case, and allows us to just see that among all the single block queries, none was made with x, thus this is a new forged MAC pair. By our direct assumption that we cannot forge new message MAC pair on f k1 (), this is a contradiction.
Hence there could not have been an attack on ENMAC for single block. We also note that the unambiguous padding scheme used in ENMAC guarantees that for every message x queried by ENMAC(x) means there is a unique message (x; pad; 1) queried by the real MAC f k1 (x; pad; 1). If the multiple block ENMAC was what was forged rst by A E then we have to show that this allows A f to forge new messages and MAC pair on f k1 (). We formally prove the theorem below, but rst we de ne some useful events and their probabilities: A f forges : the event where A f correctly forges a mac of f k1 () E : the event where A E correctly forges a mac of ENMAC() E : the event where A E fails to correctly forge a mac of ENMAC() E 1 : the event where A E correctly forges (x; y = ENMAC(x)) and message x fits in a single block E + : the event where A E correctly forges (x; y = ENMAC(x)) and message x requires multiple blocks E +;pref6 = : the event where A E correctly forges (x; y = ENMAC(x) and message x requires multiple blocks and x pref 6 = x i;pref of any queried messages x i x 1 : : : x q E +;pref= : the event where A E correctly forges (x; y = ENMAC(x) and message x requires multiple blocks and x pref = x i;pref of some queried message E 1 : P(E 1 ) E + : P(E + ) E + ;pref 6 = : P(E +;pref6 = ) E + ;pref = : P(E +;pref= ) We note that E = E 1 + E + where E 1 is the event and E 1 is the probability that ENMAC is attacked and the ENMAC message forged by A E is about one block size, or to be precise less than b ? 2 bits. And let E + be the event and E + be the probability that ENMAC is attacked and the ENMAC message forged by A E is larger than one block size. Furthermore, E + = E + ;pref 6 = + E + ;pref = where E + ;pref 6 = is the probability that the ENMAC is forged with a multi block message and the pre x of the message does not equal the pre x of any of the messages previously queried by A E . And E + ;pref = is the probability that the ENMAC is forged with a multi block message and the pre x of the message is equal to pre x of some previously queried messages by A E . In this case we know the su x of the forged message has to be di erent than the su x of the messages with the same pre x. We begin the proof: P A f forges] = P A f forges \ E] + P A f forges \ E]
(1)
In equation 1, P A f forges \ E] = 0 because when A E fails and outputs a message/tag pair (x; y) where y 6 = ENMAC(x) then A f will also output incorrect message/tag pair. In the case of a single block message, A f will output the message/tag pair ( x; pad; 1]; y) but since y 6 = ENMAC(x) and ENMAC(x) = f k1 (x; pad; 1) then y 6 = f k1 (x; pad; 1), thus A f has also output an incorrect message/tag pair. Similarly, for the multi block case if A f will output the message/tag pair ( x pref ; F k2 (x suf f ); 0]; y) but since y 6 = ENMAC(x) and ENMAC(x) = f k1 (x i;pref ; F k 2 (x i;suf f ); 0) then y 6 = f k1 (x i;pref ; F k 2 (x i;suf f ); 0), thus A f has also output an incorrect message/tag pair. 
= 1 E 1 + 1 E + ;pref 6 = + P A f forges \ E +;pref= ]
= E 1 + E + ;pref 6 = + P A f forges \ E +;pref= ]
In 
where S pref = is the set of x i x 1 : : : x q such that x i;pref = x pref = E 1 + E + ;pref 6 = + P E +;pref= ] ? P (9j S pref = s:t: (F k2 (x suf f ) = F k2 (x j;suf f ))) \ E +;pref= ] (9) = E ?P ( 9j S pref = s:t: ( F k2 (x suf f ) = F k2 (x j;suf f ) ) ) \ E +;pref= ]
Equation 7 is transformed to equation 8 because the event A f forges \E +;pref= will happen when E +;pref= happens and F k2 (x suf f ) is not equal to F k2 (x i;suf f ), the su x of any other previously queried x i whose pre x x i;pref = x pref . To repeat, in that case even when the pre xes are the same, F k2 (x suf f ) is not equal to any other previously queried F k2 (x i;suf f ). Thus the message (x pref ; F k2 (x suf f ); 0) would not have been queried before and A f would have correctly forged a new mac f k1 (). In equation 8, the last term is really stating the probability of no collision in x suf f and S pref = . In equation 9, the last term is really stating the probability of a collision in x suf f and S pref = . Equation 9 can be derived from equation 8 by noting that: P E +;pref= ] = P no collision in x suf f and S pref = \ E +;pref= ] +P collision in x suf f and S pref = \ E +;pref= ]
or more formally = P ( 8j S pref = ( F k2 (x suf f ) 6 = F k2 (x j;suf f ) ) ) \ E +;pref= ] +P ( 9j S pref = s:t: ( F k2 (x suf f ) = F k2 (x j;suf f ) ) ) \ E +;pref= ]
To bound the value of P ( 9j S pref = s:t: ( F k2 (x suf f ) = F k2 (x j;suf f ) ) ) \ E +;pref= ] in equation 10, we will use the lemma below:
Lemma 1 P ( 9j S pref = ( F k2 (x suf f ) = F k2 (x j;suf f ) ) ) \ 
Equation 12 simply restates the de nition of f and notes that probability of success of A f , a particular kind of algorithm, has to be less than or equal to probability of success by the best algorithm. This completes the proof of theorem 1. An alternate proof of theorem 1 is presented in Appendix B which more closely follows the NMAC proof style.
Practical Implementations
In the case of multiple block ENMAC, forming x suf f , beginning at a non-word boundary may cause us to re-align all the words in x suf f . We can avoid this case by using this variant (presented in the bit processing mode) of ENMAC: A similar security proof described in the last section applies to this variant since the independence of the single block compression call and multiple block compression call is preserved by the last indicator bit, and in the single block case unambiguous padding is used. Other variants are possible where the single block indicator bit is placed in a di erent location, for example, as the rst bit of the block. Also since in practice data is often processed in bytes, it may be appropriate to perform the single block case when the message jxj is less than b ? 8 bits rather than the b ? 2 bits we speci ed.
One Key ENMAC
A variant of NMAC would be to use a keyless hash function in the inner call rather than a keyed hash function. Similar security proofs will work if one makes the assumption that the hash function is not only weakly collision resistant but also simply collision resistant.
One key ENMAC k (x) = f k 1 (x; pad; Since the underlying hash function SHA-1 appends its own 64 bit length value and a mandatory padding bit, the largest possible string that can be fed to F in the SHA-1 case is 447 bits. As speci ed for the single block case of ENMAC, we reserve the last 447th bit as a single block indicator bit which is set to 1 for the single block case and set to 0 for the multiple block case. Also the single block padding scheme "pad" described in the ENMAC case is used here, hence one more bit is reserved for padding. Thus if the message is less than or equal to 445 bits then we treat it as a single block case. Even for the single block case two calls to the compression are needed, rst to process the 512 bit value k opad and then the actual (445 or less) message x. If we look upon k 1 = f(IV; k opad) then the relationship of EHMAC to ENMAC seems more apparent.
For the multiple block case similar HMAC preprocessing is added, but the length of x suf f that can be loaded in the outer call has to be reduced to accommodate the length and pad appending of the underlying SHA-1 hash function.
A variant of EHMAC which is slightly more e cient for the single block case is possible where instead of specifying a pad scheme, a "1" is appended to x in the single block case and a "0" is appended in the multiple block case. The security is preserved because SHA-1 hash function itself has an unambiguous method of padding.
6 Conclusion NMAC and HMAC are e cient for long messages, however, for short messages the nested constructions results in a signi cant ine ciency. For example to MAC a message shorter than a block, HMAC requires at least two calls to the hash function rather than one. We proposed an enhancement that allows both short and long messages to be message authenticated more e ciently than HMAC while also providing proofs of security. For a message smaller than a block our MAC only requires one call to the hash function. We discuss various variants of our constructions.
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Lemma 1 states that the joint probability of the event that E +;pref= happens where A E forges a multi block message with its pre x, x pref , being equal to pre x of some previously queried message, x i;pref , and there is a collision of x suf f and a message in set S pref = is less than F . Suppose that the probability of P ( 9j S pref = s:t: ( F k2 (x suf f ) = F k2 (x j;suf f ) ) ) \ E +;pref= ] is signi cant then we can, similar to A f , create an algorithm A F which will nd collisions on the hash function F k2 ().
This particular way of nding collisions we know is bounded above by F , the probability that the best algorithm nds a collision. We now describe the algorithm A F shown in gure 4. Instead of choosing a random k 2 as in A f , we choose a random key k 1 since we are trying to break the collision resistant function F k2 and not the mac function f k1 . The algorithm A E will ask to see the ENMAC on various messages x i . We answer these queries correctly, as was done in A f , so to A E it looks like the answers are coming from a true ENMAC function. To calculate ENMAC on x i we check if its a single block message, if it is then A F itself calculates f k1 (x i ; pad; 1) since it knows the key k 1 . If x i is a multi block message then A F rst makes a query call to the real hash function F k2 () with the argument x i;suf f . A F takes this answer and uses key k 1 to form the mac of f k1 (x i;pref ; F k2 (x i;suf f ); 0) and gives to A E . When A E gives a forgery (x; y), we see if its a multi block message and whether its x pref equals x i;pref for some previously queried x i . If it doesn't then A F says no collision found. If the set S pref = is not empty then we query F k2 (x suf f ) and see if it equals F k2 (x j;suf f ) for some j in S pref = . If it does then we output the pair x suf f and x j;suf f as collision points and stop.
The probability of A F nding a collision this way has to be less than the probability of nding collision by the best algorithm which is F . But we also see that the probability of A F nding a collision is the same as the event in A f of ( 9j S pref = s:t: ( F(x suf f ) = F(x j;suf f ) ) ) \ E +;pref= .
Thus this will also be bounded by In this alternate proof we proceed from the probability of A f failing to forge a correct mac of f k1 () rather than the P A f forges] as done in the main proof. the P A f fails j E +;pref6 = ] is zero because if a correct pair was forged with a pre x di erent then any previously queried then this pre x will be a new input to the message/tag pair output by A f which is (x pref ; F k2 (x suf f ); 0) as message and f k1 (x pref ; F k2 (x suf f ); 0) as tag. 
Equation 26 equates the P A f fails \ E +;pref= ] in equation 25 with the probability of nding a collision in F k2 (x suf f ) and another F k2 (x j;suf f ) where x j is from the set S pref = . Lemma 1 deals exactly with this probability and we use Lemma 1 to bound this collision probability in equation 27. Equation 28 restates the fact that even the best algorithm will fail to forge with probability greater than 1 ? f . And in turn the particular algorithm A f will fail to forge with probability greater than or equal to that. In equation 30 we complete the alternate proof of theorem 1.
